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CALVIN'S "SENSE OF DIVINITY" AND
EXTERNALIST KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
David Reiter

In this paper I explore and defend an interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of the sense
of divinity which implies the following claim: (CSD) All sane cognizers know that
God exists. [argue that externalism about knowledge comports well with claim
CSD, and I explore various questions about the character of the theistic belief
implied by CSD. For example, I argue that CSD implies that all sane cognizers possess functionally rational theistic belief. In the final sections of the paper, I respond
to two main objections and argue that CSD is consistent with the existence of various kinds of atheists and agnostics.

According to John Calvin, human beings naturally possess a "sense of divinity" -i.e., they naturally possess some awareness of God. This paper explores a
robust interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity, according to
which any sane cognizer knows that God exists. This interpretation is robust in
at least two respects. First, with respect to the level of awareness, this interpretation asserts that the sense of divinity yields knowledge of God, as opposed to
yielding mere justified or rational belief in God. Second, with respect to the
scope of awareness, this interpretation asserts that knowledge of God is nearly
universal among human cognizers. In this paper, I articulate and explore this
interpretation, and then defend it against two main objections.
The paper is structured as follows: In section one, I highlight three main
features of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity and formulate the robust
interpretation. In section two, I briefly characterize the externalist approach
to knowledge, and explain why it comports well with Calvin's doctrine.
Section three is a discussion of four questions: 1. Does Calvin's doctrine of
the sense of divinity entail that sane cognizers have basic theistic belief? 2.
Does it entail the existence of a successful natural theology? 3. Does it entail
that sane cognizers have rational theistic belief? 4. Does it entail that there is
no evidence against theism? Sections four and five deal with two objections
that might be raised against CSD. Section four considers the claim that CSD
is objectionable because it precludes the existence of atheists. Finally, section
five considers the claim that CSD is objectionable because it precludes the
existence of agnostics.

1. Calvin's Doctrine of the Sense of Divinity
The essence of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity is that God
has naturally implanted in each human being a "sense of divinity" or
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"seed of religion": "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity." (1.3.1., 43)' By virtue of this
sense of divinity, human beings naturally possess a kind of knowledge
of God. I will now highlight three features of Calvin's doctrine of the
sense of divinity.
1. Although the sense of divinity provides some kind of knowledge of
God, it does not provide knowledge of God in what I shall call the strict
or proper sense. On Calvin's understanding, knowledge of God in the
strict or proper sense involves more than a mere cognitive grasp of the
proposition that God exists-it also essentially involves grasping how
one ought to be situated as a creature with respect to this God:
Now, the knowledge of God, as I understand it, is that by which
we not only conceive that there is a God but also grasp what befits
us and is proper to his glory, in fine, what it is to our advantage to
know of him. Indeed, we shall not say that, properly speaking,
God is known where there is no religion or piety. (1.2.1.,39).
The point to be emphasized here is that Calvin's concept of knowledge
of God in the strict or proper sense is a religiously rich concept. For the
possession of knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense entails the
practice of piety. McNeill comments that "It is a favorite emphasis in
Calvin that pietas, piety, in which reverence and love of God are joined,
is prerequisite to any true knowledge of God." (39)
Under the fall, the sense of divinity does not provide us with knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense. Calvin indicates that if Adam
had not fallen, then humans would naturally possess knowledge of God
in the strict or proper sense: "the very order of nature would have led us
[to this knowledge] if Adam had remained upright." (1.2.1.,40)
2. Although the sense of divinity does not (under the fall) provide
knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense, Calvin holds that it does
provide what I shall call bare knowledge that God exists. In my usage, to
say that a person possesses bare knowledge of God is precisely to say
that he or she knows that the proposition God exists is true. I am calling
this "bare knowledge" in order to sharply differentiate it from what we
have been calling "knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense."
Possessing knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense entails possessing bare knowledge of God, but the converse is not true.
The heading of book I chapter 3 is "The Knowledge of God Has Been
Naturally Implanted in the Minds of Men." And Calvin makes it clear
that the sense of divinity provides this bare knowledge of God even
under the fall:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an
awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To
prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance,
God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of
his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he repeatedly
sheds fresh drops. Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that
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there is a God and that he is their Maker, they are condemned by
their own testimony because they have failed to honor him and to
consecrate their lives to his will. [emphasis mine] (1.3.1,43-44)
It is evident from the last sentence of this passage that the sense of divinity provides knowledge of God's existence even under the fall-for
those who perceive that there is a God are condemned by their failure to
honor Him.'
3. Although the sense of divinity does provide the bare knowledge that
God exists, Calvin is very emphatic that under the fall, the sense of divinity is compatible with all sorts of superstition and rebellion against God.
(Note that this is a consequence of the first point discussed above, that the
sense of divinity under the fall fails to provide knowledge of God in the
strict or proper sense.) This is the main theme of chapter four of book one,
which is headed "This knowledge [provided by the sense of divinity] is
either smothered or corrupted, partly by ignorance, partly by malice." In
this chapter, Calvin stresses that as a consequence of the fall, people naturally respond to bare knowledge of God in an inappropriate manner:

Experience teaches that the seed of religion has been divinely planted in all men. But barely one man in a hundred can be found who
nourishes in his own heart what he has conceived; and not even one
in whom it matures, much less bears fruit in its season [d. Ps. 1:3].
Now some lose themselves in their own superstition, while others
of their own evil intention revolt from God, yet all fall away from
true knowledge of him. As a result, no real piety remains in the
world. But as to my statement that some erroneously slip into
superstition, I do not mean by this that their ingenuousness should
free them from blame. For the blindness under which they labor is
almost always mixed with proud vanity and obstinacy. (1.4.1,47)
It is clear then that while knowledge of God in the strict or proper sense

entails pious living, bare knowledge of God does not.
Having briefly reviewed some of the main features of Calvin's doctrine of the sense of divinity, I now turn to formulating what 1 take to be
a central implication of Calvin's doctrine. We have seen that according
to Calvin, "men one and all perceive that there is a God." (1.3.1, 43-44)
Therefore, I think the following is a reasonable starting point:
(1) For any human being S, S knows that God exists.

Perhaps someone might object against (1) that Calvin means to claim
only that all mature or adult human beings perceive that there is a God.
However, I think this is mistaken, since Calvin writes that: "it [the sense
of divinity] is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one
of which each of us is master from his mother's womb and which nature
itself permits no one to forget, although many strive with every nerve to
that end." (1.3.1,46) Nevertheless, I think that it is appropriate to qualify
(1) for the following reason. Even if Calvin means to assert that human
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beings possess knowledge of God at birth or at some stage prior to birth,
it does not follow that he also means to assert that human beings possess
knowledge of God at even earlier stages of existence. Consider a human
zygote. If, as I believe, a human zygote is a human being, then (1)
implies that this zygote possesses propositional knowledge that God
exists. But we do not know that a human zygote even has the capacity to
have propositional knowledge. Therefore, I believe it is reasonable to
amend (1) as follows:
(1 *) For any human being S, if S has any propositional knowledge
at time t, then S knows at t that God exists.

If we let the term "cognizer" mean "human being who has some proposi-

tional knowledge," then (1 *) is equivalent to the claim that all cognizers
know that God exists. This claim allows for the possibility that there are
some human beings who, perhaps because they are at very early stages
of existence, are not yet cognizers.! But I believe we ought to add one
more qualification to (1 *). I think it is reasonable to qualify (1 *) to allow
for the possibility that someone who is insane or suffers from severe
brain damage might have some propositional knowledge but nevertheless lack knowledge that God exists. Here I propose to use the term
"sane" to mean something like "someone who is neither insane nor suffers from severe brain damage." So we can now amend (1 *) as follows:
(CSD) For any sane human being 5, if 5 has any propositional knowledge
at t, then 5 knows at t that God exists."
Given our terminology, (CSD) can also be expressed as the claim that for
any sane cognizer S, S knows that God exists. Given the standard
assumption that knowledge entails belief, CSD implies that all sane cognizers are theists. s Of course, CSD implies neither that every sane cognizer is a self-conscious theist (i.e., someone who is aware of their belief
that God exists) nor a professing theist (i.e., someone who professes or
claims before others belief that God exists). In the final sections of this
paper, we will consider the question of whether CSD is consistent with
the existence of sane cognizers who are either atheists or agnostics.

2. The Significance of Externalism for C5D
In this section, I want to explain why the externalist approach to
knowledge is relevant to our discussion of Calvin's doctrine of the sense
of divinity. In order to explain the externalist approach to knowledge, it
is first necessary to explain internalism about warrant, where warrant is
that which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true
belie£.6 An internalist approach to knowledge is one which places one or
more internalist constraints on warrant.' Now rather than attempting to
give a general characterization of just what counts as an internalist constraint (a task that might involve considerable difficulty), I will provide
a few paradigm examples of internalist constraints:
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a. 5 is warranted in believing that p only if 5 can tell just by reflection that S is violating no epistemic duties in believing that p.
b. S is warranted in believing that p only if S can tell just by reflection that S has adequate reasons for believing that p.
c. S is warranted in believing that that p only if S has adequate reasons for believing that p.
The externalist approach to knowledge is simply the denial of internalism; externalism imposes no internalist constraints on warrant. Here
then are some examples of externalist theories of knowledge:
a. Skp (i.e., S knows that p) iff S believes p because p is true (causal
theory).
b. Skp iff S's belief p is true and reliably produced (reliabilism).
c. Skp iff S's belief p is true and produced by properly functioning
cognitive faculties (abbreviated statement of Plantinga's warrant
theory).
The causal and reliabilist theories were both proposed by Alvin
Goldman. 8 While it is generally acknowledged that the causal theory suffers from serious difficulties, it is arguable that reliabilism is the dominant
theory of knowledge in contemporary epistemology. However, Alvin
Plantinga has argued that reliabilism is inadequate, and that his warrant
theory is a superior alternative to reliabilism. 9 But the point I want to
stress here is that on each of these three theories, it is in general possible for
a person to possess knowledge without satisfying any internalist constraints. For example, on a simple reliabilist theory of knowledge, it is
quite possible for me to know that it is 80 degrees outside, even if I cannot
tell just by reflection that I have adequate reasons for believing this.
There are at least two potentially attractive features of externalist
approaches to knowledge. First, externalism appears to provide simple
solutions to some traditional epistemological problems. For example,
philosophers have grappled with the problem of whether beliefs formed
on the basis of induction have positive epistemic status. Reliabilist
externalism provides a simple and reassuring solution to this problem: if
true beliefs based on induction are formed in a sufficiently reliable fashion, then they count as knowledge-problem solved! Second, because
externalism imposes no internalist constraints on warrant, it makes
knowledge more accessible to infants, young children, and animals. For
satisfaction of the internalist constraints often requires that the cognizer
possess well-developed cognitive faculties and perhaps even concepts
such as that of epistemically justified belief. This general point carries
implications for our discussion of knowledge of God. If there are no
internalist constraints on warranted belief in God, then knowledge of
God also becomes more widely accessible.lO Thus, Alston has claimed
that on a relatively externalist approach to knowledge, "it is quite possible that knowledge of God extends more widely than many of us suspect."" Alston's point suggests that the externalist approach to knowl-
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edge should be attractive to the defender of CSD. Therefore, throughout
the rest of this paper, I shall adopt the externalist approach to knowledge as a working hypothesis. Hence, the remainder of the paper will
explore the implications of (CSD) on an externalist reading. 12

3. Exploring Some Implications of CSD
In this section, we will discuss four questions, each of which explores
implications of CSD. These questions are: 1. Does CSD entail that sane
cognizers hold basic theistic belief?, 2. Does CSD entail the existence of a
successful natural theology?, 3. Does CSD entail that sane cognizers hold
rational theistic belief?, and finally, 4. Does CSD entail that there is no
evidence against theism?
1. We noted above that given the standard assumption that knowledge entails belief, CSD implies that every sane cognizer holds theistic
belief. It is then natural to inquire into the character of this theistic
belief. First then, does CSD entail basic theistic belief-i.e., belief (that
God exists) not based on propositional evidence?
In general, externalism allows that knowledge can be realized in
either basic or nonbasic belief. However, it is significant that CSD
entails that every sane cognizer acquires knowledge of God at the inception of propositional cognition. Because of this, I think it reasonable to
suppose that this early knowledge of God is realized in basic belief.
Therefore, CSD suggests that it is typical or normal for sane cognizers to
hold basic theistic belief, especially at earlier stages of cognition. But it
may also be the case in the development of some sane cognizers that
basic theistic belief eventually comes to be replaced by nonbasic theistic
belief. And nothing in CSD precludes some sane cognizers from knowing that God exists by holding nonbasic theistic belief. '3
2. Does C5D entail that the classical arguments for the existence of God
are successful? No, because externalism implies that there can be knowledge of God, even if none of the classical theistic arguments is successful.
Alston and Plantinga have argued persuasively that our beliefs about
external objects may be warranted, even if there are no good arguments
from sensory experience to the existence of external objects. 14 And
Plantinga has argued that one can be warranted in believing that there are
other minds, even if none of the traditional "other minds" arguments is
successful. 15 Given Plantinga's theory of warrant, if 5's (true) belief that
"There are other minds" is an instance of proper cognitive function (and
the other relevant conditions are met), then 5 knows that there other minds.
The same point goes for belief in God. Suppose that none of the traditional theistic arguments is successful. Nevertheless, if 5's belief that
God exists is both true and reliably produced, then Alston's RTB view
(i.e., the view that knowledge is reliably formed true belief) implies that
it is knowledge. 1" Or, if 5's belief that God exists is both true and an
instance of proper cognitive function (accompanied by the other relevant conditions), then Plantinga's warrant theory implies that 5 knows
that God exists. 17 So the externalist approach implies that CSD does /lot
entail a successful natural theology.
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3. Our third question is: does CSD entail that sane cognizers hold

rational theistic belief? But recent epistemological discussion of the concept of rationality shows that this is not a simple question. In Warrant:
The Current Debate, Plantinga identifies four different concepts of rationality.1R Therefore, we will consider four different versions of the original question "Does CSD entail rational theistic belief?," where each version corresponds to a concept of rationality identified by Plantinga.
a. Aristotelian Rationality. Here rationality is not a property of beliefs,
but a property of a creature, or perhaps a kind of creature (as in "human
beings are rational beings"). Plantinga points out that being a rational
creature is a necessary condition for the possession of knowledge.
Hence, this concept of rationality entails that any cognizer (i.e., a human
being who knows something) is a rational creature. So it obviously follows that anyone who knows that God exists is a rational creature.
b. Deliverance of Reason Rationality. On this concept, S's believing
that p is rational just in case p, the proposition believed, is a "deliverance
of reason," where this means that p is either self-evident (i.e., such that
one cannot grasp the proposition without seeing that it is necessarily true)
or is deducible from self-evident propositions by means of self-evidently
valid inferences. So, whether CSD entails rational theistic belief in this
sense depends on whether CSD entails that the proposition "God exists"
is a deliverance of reason in this narrow sense. But for all I know, CSD
neither entails (nor precludes) that "God exists" is a deliverance of
reason 1 " Therefore, for all I know, CSD does not entail rational theistic
belief in this sense. But it is important to note here that even if theistic
belief is not rational in this sense, it does not thereby follow that it is irrational. For given this concept of rationality, it is in general quite possible
that S's belief that p is neither rational nor irrationaL''' And it is important
to recognize the point emphasized by Plantinga that many paradigmatically rational beliefs are not rational in this "deliverance of reason" sense.
c. Evidentialist Deontological Rationality. On the concept of deontological rationality, according to Plantinga, S's believing that p is rational
just in case S's believing that p violates no epistemic duties. And according to evidentialist philosophers, one is permitted to believe a proposition only if the proposition either satisfies the conditions for proper basicality (e.g., by being self-evident or about one's own mental states) or
one has propositional evidence in support of that proposition.
Therefore, according to this evidentialist account, S's belief that p is
deontologically rational only if p is properly basic for S or S has propositional evidence that p.21
I think that on this evidentialist account of deontological rationality,
CSD does not entail that sane cognizers possess (deontologically) rational
theistic belief. For externalism straightforwardly implies that S can know
that p even if p does not satisfy the evidentialist conception of proper
basicality and S also lacks propositional evidence that p. But it is important to again note Plantinga's point that many paradigmatically rational
beliefs are not deontologically rational on the evidentialist account. 22
I have claimed that CSD on our externalist reading allows for the possibility that a cognizer S can know that God exists, even if S possesses no
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propositional evidence that God exists. In other words, CSD does not
entail that every sane cognizer possesses propositional evidence that
God exists. But here is a separate question: does CSD perhaps entail that
at least some sane cognizer (somewhere) possesses evidence that God
exists? In a pair of very interesting articles, Steve Wykstra has drawn
attention to precisely this question: does knowledge of God entail that
someone (somewhere) has evidence for the existence of God? Wykstra
expresses some sympathy for an affirmative answer to this question.
According to the view which he calls warrant evidentialism, a person S
knows that God exists only if there is at least some theistic evidence (i.e.,
propositional evidence that God exists) which is available to S's epistemic community. Warrant basicalism, on the other hand, holds that S
can know that God exists, even if there is no theistic evidence available
to S's epistemic community. While it may be that CSD is strictly consistent with warrant evidentialism, it probably comports much better with
warrant basicalism. The model suggested by warrant evidentialism suggests that knowledge is transmitted from those who possess evidence to
members of the community who do not, and this in turn suggests that
there would probably be some degree of failure to transmit the knowledge to all members of the community. CSD, on the other hand, entails
that each sane cognizer has the knowledge in question. 23
d. Rationality as Proper Function. I noted above that there are beliefs
(e.g., the belief that there is a tree before me) which are paradigms of
rational belief, and yet these beliefs do not qualify as deliverances of reason, nor are they rational in the deontological sense. This suggests that
there must be some other central concept of rationality.
Plantinga suggests there is a concept of rationality according to which
a particular piece or segment of cognitive functioning is rational just in
case it is proper cognitive functioning: "Here 'rationality' means absence
of dysfunction, disorder, impairment, pathology with respect to cognitive faculties."24 According to this concept, there are various cognitive
activities which can be rational or irrational: believing a proposition,
believing a proposition with a particular degree of firmness or strength,
withholding belief in a proposition, making an inference, etc. Thus we
can say that S's believing that p is functionally rational just in case S's
believing that p is an instance of proper cognitive function. And more
generally, any piece x of S's cognitive functioning is functionally rational
just in case x is an instance of proper cognitive function.
In conjunction with Plantinga's overall theory of warrant, CSD entails
that each sane cognizer does exhibit functionally rational theistic belief.
This is because according to Plantinga's theory, proper cognitive function
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for warrant, which is, in turn,
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of knowledge. However, even
if Plantinga's overall theory of warrant is incorrect, so long as proper cognitive function is a necessary condition on knowledge, then functional
rationality is a necessary condition on knowledge, so that CSD entails
.that sane cognizers possess functionally rational theistic belief. Although
philosophers such as Hasker and Alston have challenged the claim that
proper cognitive function is required for knowledge, I find this claim
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plausible, and therefore I also find it plausible that CSD entails that each
sane cognizer believes that God exists and holds this belief in a functionally rational manner.25
4. Our fourth and final question in this section is: does CSD entail that
no sane cognizer possesses evidence against theism? Plantinga has presented a "disappearing letter case" which is relevant to this question.
Here is the case:
I am applying to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a
fellowship; I write a letter to a colleague, trying to bribe him to write
the Endowment a glowing letter on my behalf; he indignantly refuses
and sends the letter to my chairman. The letter disappears from the
chairman's office under mysterious circumstances. I have a motive
for stealing it; I have the opportunity to do so; and I have been known
to do such things in the past. Furthermore, an extremely reliable
member of the department claims to have seen me furtively entering
the chairman's office at about the time when the letter must have been
stolen. The evidence against me is very strong; my colleagues
reproach me for such underhanded behavior and treat me with evident distaste. The facts of the matter, however, are that I didn't steal
the letter and in fact spent the entire afternoon in question on a solitary walk in the woods; furthermore I clearly remember spending that
afternoon walking in the woods. Hence, I believe in the basic way
(13) I was alone in the woods all that afternoon, and I did not steal
the letter.
But I do have strong evidence for the denial of (13). For I have the
same evidence as everyone else that I was in the chairman's office
and took the letter; and this evidence is sufficient to convince my
colleagues (who are eminently fairminded and initially well disposed towards me) of my guilt. 26
Plantinga thinks it is obvious that S is rational to continue believing he
did not steal the letter, in spite of the propositional evidence to the contrary. Thus Plantinga takes this case to show that: It is possible that S's
belief that p is rational even though S has strong propositional evidence
that not-po Now Planting a does not go so far as to suggest that the subject in this case might know that p ("I did not steal the letter") in spite of
the strong counterevidence, but I think it is plausible that the case can be
altered slightly to support the following principle: It is possible for S to
know that p, even though S has (some) propositional evidence that notp. Let us weaken the counterevidence somewhat by supposing that it is
not the case that S has been known to do such things in the past; then I
think it becomes plausible that S might know that he did not steal the letter, even though S has some propositional evidence that he did (for S
believes that an extremely reliable member of the department claims
that S stole the letter). The above principle <that knowledge is compatible with propositional counterevidence), which I believe is quite plausi-
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ble, suggests that C5D is consistent with the claim that some sane cognizers have (some) propositional evidence against theism. I should perhaps make it clear that I am not endorsing the claim that anyone actually
has propositional evidence against theism. T do not think this claim is
obviously true. All I am suggesting is that C5D may well be consistent
with propositional evidence against theism. Of course, it is quite clear
that C5D is also consistent with the claim that no sane cognizer has
propositional evidence against theism.

4. The First Objection: CSD Precludes Atheism
Thus far, we have explored my interpretation of Calvin's doctrine of
the sense of divinity (C5D) and seen that on this interpretation, C5D
entails that every sane cognizer is a theist. In the remaining sections of
the paper, I will defend this interpretation against two objections: 1. C5D
is objectionable because it is inconsistent with the existence of atheists,
and 2. C5D is objectionable because it is inconsistent with the existence
of agnostics.
The first objection runs as follows: if CSD is true, it follows that there
are no sane cognizers who atheists. But it is obvious that there are sane
cognizers who are atheists; hence C5D is false. I will consider two different versions of this objection. The first version claims that it is impossible for someone to hold contradictory beliefs, and therefore (given that
propositional knowledge entails belief) CSD precludes anyone from
believing the contradictory of "God exists." The second version concedes the possibility of holding contradictory beliefs, but it claims that
whenever a person 5 believes a pair of contradictory propositions, then
it is not the case that 5 knows either of these propositions.
We will begin with the first version. If it is impossible to hold contradictory beliefs, then (given that propositional knowledge entails belief)
C5D precludes sane cognizers from believing that God does not existi.e., C5D precludes atheism.
50 is it possible for a person to simultaneously hold contradictory
beliefs?27 (For convenience, I will omit the qualifier "simultaneously"
throughout the remainder of this discussion-so it should be understood as implicit.) More precisely, the question we are discussing here is
whether it is possible for someone to believe a proposition p, and at the
same time also believe the contradictory of that proposition-viz., not-po
50 we are not discussing the distinct question of whether a person can
believe a self-contradictory proposition of the form (p and not-p). Nor
are we discussing the distinct question of whether a person can simultaneously believe propositions which are inconsistent with each other (I
think it is uncontroversial that this is unfortunately quite possible).
Let's start with this question: is it possible for a person to occurently
hold contradictory beliefs? Let us say that S occurently believes p at t just
in case S believes p and S is (consciously) thinking that p at t. (And we can
say that S dispositionally (or non-occurently) believes p at t just in case S
believes p but is not (consciously) thinking that p at t.) 50 a question which
arises here is whether it is possible for someone to think that p and at the
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very same time to think that not-p? I submit that this seems impossible
to me, in nearly the same way that it seems impossible to me that someone could think that (p and not-p) at some time. So I will not defend the
claim that a person might occurently hold contradictory beliefs.
Is it then possible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs, where at
least one member of the pair is held non-occurently (or dispositionally),
and where both members of the pair are ordinary beliefs? (Let us say,
following Richard Foley, that an ordinary belief is just a belief which is
neither repressed nor unconscious. We will bring non-ordinary beliefs
into the discussion a bit later.)
In an article entitled "Is It Possible to Have Contradictory Beliefs?,"
Richard Foley has defended the claim that it is impossible for a person to
hold contradictory beliefs, when both members of the pair are ordinary
beliefs.28 For convenience, I will refer to this as the impossibility thesis.
Foley defends the impossibility thesis by arguing for the following claim,
which I shall just refer to as Foley's premise: For any putative case of contra-

dictory (ordinary) beliefs, that case can be given a plausible explanation as a case
where the person does not genuinely hold contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. (For
convenience, let's call an explanation which implies that the person does
not genuinely hold contradictory ordinary beliefs a "non-genuine explanation.") Foley explains six different strategies for providing non-genuine explanations for any putative case of contradictory (ordinary)
beliefs. For example, the case may be explained by supposing that the
person holds inconsistent but not contradictory beliefs, or that the person
holds contradictory beliefs but not simultaneously, or that the person
holds contradictory beliefs but one member is a non-ordinary belief.
My evaluation is that Foley'S defense of the impossibility thesis is
rather weak. First, it is unclear to me that Foley adequately supports his
premise that any putative case of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs can be
given a plausible non-genuine explanation. For it is unclear that Foley
considers all of the relevant kinds of cases-e.g., Foley does not consider
any putative cases of self-deception, where it might be thought that
these cases cannot be given plausible non-genuine explanations. But the
main point I want to make is this: even if Foley's premise is true, it does
not follow that it is impossible for someone to hold contradictory (ordinary) beliefs. Foley's premise only entails that if there are any genuine
cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs, then those cases can be given a
plausible (but false) explanation as non-genuine.
Foley'S premise does not entail the impossibility thesis. Indeed, his
premise does not even entail the much weaker thesis (i.e., weaker relative to the impossibility thesis) that it is always rationally preferable to
explain any putative case of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs as non-genuine. Note that Foley'S premise is perfectly consistent with each of the
following claims:
A. There are some putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs
such that these cases can be given a plausible explanation as a case
where the person genuinely holds contradictory (ordinary) beliefs.
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B. There are some putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs
such that the most plausible explanation is that the person genuinely
holds contradictory (ordinary) beliefs.
Given Foley's premise, if either A or B is true, then it follows that there
are putative cases of contradictory (ordinary) beliefs which are susceptible of explanations, where these explanations are inconsistent with each
other but both are plausible. If A is true, then there may be cases where
it is not rationally preferable to explain them as non-genuine, since the
genuine explanation may be just as plausible as the non-genuine explanation. And if B is true, then there are cases where (i) the non-genuine
explanation is not rationally preferable, and (ii) the genuine explanation
is the rationally preferable explanation. 50 even if Foley has succeeded
in establishing his premise (and it is unclear to me that he has succeeded
even in this), he has not provided strong reason to believe that it is
impossible for someone to hold contradictory (ordinary) beliefs.
I have argued that Foley's argument fails to warrant us in believing
that it is impossible for a person to hold contradictory ordinary beliefs.
To conclude this section, I will argue that even if Foley's impossibility
thesis turns out to be true, there are at least two other relevant possibilities which should be considered.
First, it is important that so far we have been restricting our focus to
consideration of cases where both members of the pair are ordinary
beliefs. And even if these ordinary-belief cases are impossible, it still
might be possible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs where at
least one member of the pair is a nOll-ordinary belief-i.e., a belief which
is unconscious or repressed. Foley explicitly limits his argument to
showing that it is impossible to hold contradictory ordinary beliefs-he
states explicitly that he does not want to argue that it is impossible to
have contradictory beliefs where at least one member of the pair is a
non-ordinary belief,29
5econd, let's suppose for the sake of argument that it is flat-out impossible for a person to hold contradictory beliefs, regardless of whether one
member of the pair is a non-ordinary belief. At this point I think it is
important to consider a distinction drawn by some philosophers between
belief and acceptance. This distinction has been discussed by Plantinga
and Lehrer, and developed in impressive detail by L. Jonathan Cohen.'" I
will explain this distinction by following Cohen's account.
According to Cohen, for 5 to believe that p is for 5 to be disposed
such that whenever 5 considers p 5 normally feels it true that p. On the
other hand, for 5 to accept that p is for 5 to have chosen a policy of using
p as a premise in 5's reasoning and decision-making. Because of these
differences, belief and acceptance are logically independent in that one
can believe a proposition not accepted, and one can accept a proposition
not believed. For example, although the moral skeptic may not accept
the proposition Some actions are right and others wrong, she may nonetheless find herself compelled to believe this proposition. And although
she may accept the proposition No actions are either right or wrong, she
may be humanly unable to believe this proposition. Cohen argues that
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while belief is involuntary (although we can do things which influence
what beliefs we hold), acceptance is fully voluntary-we choose or
decide what propositions we will accept.
The point I want to highlight here is that it is possible for a person to
believe that p while simultaneously accepting that not-po Cohen claims
that this is what is going on in self-deception. If Cohen is correct, then it
may also be possible for a person who believes that God exists to simultaneously accept that God does not exist. That is, it is possible that some
people might be disposed to normally feel it true that God exists whenever they consider the matter, while they also have a policy of using the
proposition God does not exist as a premise in their reasoning and decisionmaking. 50 even if holding contradictory beliefs is flat-out impossible, if
Cohen's account of self-deception is correct, then C5D does not preclude
the existence of atheists-i.e., provided that the definition of atheism is
broadened so that atheistic acceptance is a sufficient condition for atheism.
Let me conclude our discussion of the first version of this objection by
summarizing its results: 1. I have argued that Foley's discussion does
not adequately support the thesis that it is impossible for a person to
hold contradictory ordinary beliefs. 2. I have noted that even someone
like Foley (who defends the impossibility thesis) allows room for the
possibility that holding contradictory beliefs is possible when at least
one member of the pair is a non-ordinary belief. And 3. I have suggested that even if it is flat-out impossible for a person to hold contradictory
beliefs, the putative distinction between belief and acceptance makes relevant Cohen's claim that a person can believe that p while simultaneously accepting that not-po Given these results, I conclude that we are
not warranted in claiming that C5D precludes atheism.
We will now consider the second version of the objection that CSD
precludes atheism. This objection concedes the possibility of holding
contradictory beliefs, but claims that whenever a person 5 believes a pair
of contradictory propositions, then it is not the case that S knows either of
these propositions. For if S believes the proposition not-p, then S has a
rebutting defeater for the proposition p, and this precludes SIS knowing
that p (since propositional knowledge requires the absence of a defeater).
I shall make three points in response to this objection. First, this
objection fails if a hardcore externalist account of knowledge is correct.
For on this sort of account, if S's (true) belief that p is produced by a reliable belief-forming process, then S has knowledge that p, regardless of
whether SIS belief that p is irrational due to the presence of a rebutting
defeater.31 Therefore, even if it is a true principle that S has a rebutting
defeater for p whenever S believes not-p, this does not preclude a situation where S believes that not-p and yet knows that p.
Second, this objection succeeds only if S has an undefeated rebutting
defeater for p whenever S believes that not-po To clarify this point, it
will be helpful to briefly discuss the nature of defeaters.32 In general, a
defeater is a reason for withholding belief in a proposition, so that S has
a defeater for p just in case S has a reason to withhold belief that p. If I
believe that (F) Feike cannot swim, and 1 then learn that Feike is a lifeguard,
I have acquired a rebutting defeater for (F). But defeaters can them-
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selves be defeated. If I later learn that Feike is a Frisian lifeguard and 99
out of 100 Frisian lifeguards cannot swim, then my original defeater for (F)
has been defeated, and it is rational for me to believe (F) Feike cannot
swim. If S has an undefeated defeater for p (i.e., a defeater for p which is
not itself defeated) but nevertheless believes p, then S's belief that p is
irrational. Two kinds of defeaters have been identified in the literature:
S has a rebutting defeater for p where S has a reason for thinking that p is
false, and S has an underclltting defeater for p where S has something
which undermines the adequacy or reliability of S's reason(s) for thinking that p is true. We can now return to the objection that if S is an atheist, then S has an undefeated rebutting defeater for theism so that S cannot know that God exists.
The objection is successful only upon the assumption that whenever a
person S believes a proposition not-p, then it is also the case that S has
an undefeated rebutting defeater for p. But this principle seems false.
Suppose that Norman just finds himself with the belief that (not-w) The
President is not in the White House, although Norman has nothing that
would normally be regarded as evidence that the President is not in the
White House. (We may suppose that Norman's belief that not-w is produced by a reliable but fallible power of clairvoyance.) And suppose
that Norman in fact has strong evidence for the proposition that (w) The
President is in the White House. (Suppose Norman is sitting in a room
in the White House, witnessing the President give a news conference.)
Is this a situation where Norman has an undefeated rebutting defeater
for the proposition that w? I suggest that if Norman does possess a
rebutting defeater for w (just by virtue of the fact that he believes that
not-w), then this defeater is itself defeated (by Norman's strong evidence for w), so that it is not the case that Norman has an undefeated
defeater for w. Thus, at least as far as defeaters are concerned, there is
nothing to preclude Norman from knowing that (w) The President is in
the White House (in spite of the fact that he also believes the contradictory of this proposition). Thus, even if it is true that S has a rebutting
defeater for p whenever S believes not-p, it appears false that S has an
undefeated rebutting defeater for p whenever S believes not-p.33
Finally, it is also important to mention cases of self-deception, where it
seems that a person knows that p is true, even while he or she (somehow)
believes the proposition not-po If, as some philosophers claim, there are
genuine cases of this sort (not necessarily involving theistic and atheistic
belief), then the objection is mistaken (since these are cases where S
believes that not-p while knowing that p).34 I conclude that this second version of the objection also fails to preclude the possibility that a sane cognizer who is an atheist might nevertheless possess knowledge that God exists.

5. The Second Objection: CSD Precludes Agnosticism
The second objection runs as follows: if CSD is true, it follows that
. there are no agnostics. But it is obvious that there are agnostics; hence
CSD is false.
r will begin my response to this objection by distinguishing four dif-
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ferent kinds of agnosticism. First, S is a doxastic agnostic just in case S is
neither a theist nor an atheist (i.e., S does not believe the proposition
"God exists," nor does S believe the proposition "God does not exist").
Second, S is a professing agnostic just in case S claims and/ or believes
that S is neither a theist nor an atheist (in other words, S claims and/or
believes that S is a doxastic agnostic). Third, S is a classical agnostic just
in case S believes that neither theism nor atheism can be rationally justified or warranted. 35 And finally, S is an acceptance agnostic just in case S
accepts neither theism nor atheism.
Now it is obvious that there are professing agnostics in the world, but
this fact is perfectly consistent with the truth of CSD. For it is possible
that all sane cognizers who are professing agnostics are actually theists
who mistakenly (even if sincerely) believe that they are neither theists
nor atheists. Perhaps it is also obvious that there are classical agnostics
in the world, but this too is consistent with CSD. For a sane cognizer
who believes that neither theism nor atheism can be rationally justified
might nevertheless believe the proposition "God exists." And it is clear
from our discussion of belief and acceptance that CSD is consistent with
the existence of acceptance agnostics. Thus, CSD is only inconsistent
with the existence of doxastic agnostics. But I question whether it is
obvious that there are doxastic agnostics. Certainly, the claim that there
are doxastic agnostics is not nearly as obvious as the claim that there are
professing agnostics, and therefore I think this is by no means a decisive
objection against CSD.

6. Conclusion
I will conclude by briefly summarizing what I take to be the most significant results of our discussion. First, we have seen that CSD suggests
that sane cognizers typically possess basic theistic belief, especially at
early stages of cognitive development. And while CSD does not entail
the existence of a successful natural theology, nor does it preclude the
existence of evidence against theism, it is plausible that CSD entails that
each sane cognizer is functionally rational in holding theistic belief.
Finally, I have argued that even though it entails that every sane cognizer is a theist, CSD is consistent with the existence of various kinds of
atheists and agnostics. 3n
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